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 1.  Introduction  
Since the early 1990s, commercial banks have turned to Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLBank) 
advances to plug the gap between loan and deposit growth.  Between 1992 and 2000, for example, annual 
loan growth at U.S. commercial banks averaged 7.8 percent while annual core deposit growth averaged 
just 3.4 percent.  In contrast, loan growth averaged 5.5 percent per year between 1984 and 1990 and core 
deposit growth averaged 8.0 percent.
1  The pickup in loan growth in the 1990s, which showed up at large 
as well as community banks, reflected the length and strength of the economic expansion.  The slowdown 
in core-deposit growth reflected heightened consumer interest in deposit substitutes such as money-
market mutual funds. 
The increasing importance of the FHLBank System to depository institutions can be seen in the 
jump in membership and advances.  Between 1992 and 2000, the number of FHLBank members more 
than doubled, fueled by the opening of membership to commercial banks.  (See Table 1.)  Over the same 
period, advances outstanding to System members more than quintupled.  For community financial 
institutions (CFIs)—defined by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLB) as banks with less than $500 
million in assets (1999 dollars)—the growth was even more impressive: membership increased by a factor 
of four, and outstanding advances increased by a factor of 16.  Along with broadening the range of 
permissible activities for banking organizations, GLB relaxed membership and collateral requirements for 
community financial institutions.  As a consequence, nearly all of the nation’s thrifts and commercial 
banks are eligible to join the FHLBank System (Feldman and Schmidt, 2000).  At year-end 2004, System 
membership topped 8,100, over 70 percent of whom were commercial banks.  And during 2002, advances 
outstanding to banks topped advances to thrifts for the first time.
2
                                                                  
1 Core deposits are “sticky,” remaining with the bank despite changes in failure risk or economic climate.  Bank supervisors 
classify small time and transactions deposits as core deposits.  These deposits are insured, which accounts for their “core” nature.  
Except where noted, all bank financial data save advances data were drawn from the Reports on Income and Condition for U.S. 
commercial banks (the Call Reports), various years.  Bank level data on advances before 2001 were obtained from the Federal 
Housing Finance Board.  Since 2001, “advances outstanding” has been a line on the Call Report.  
2 Except where noted, all structure and financial data for the FHLBank System were drawn from the Federal Housing Finance 
Board.   
Do FHLBank membership and advances lead to greater bank risk-taking?  In theory, advances 
could lead to an increase or decrease in risk.  On the one hand, FHLBank advances permit member banks 
to fund risky activities without paying a market penalty for increases in failure probability.  Indeed, 
previous research (Ashley, Brewer, and Vincent, 1998) has demonstrated that troubled thrifts used 
FHLBank funding to evade market discipline during the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s.  On the other hand, the FHLBank System allows banks of all sizes to tap the capital markets 
at minimal transactions costs.  Advances come in a myriad of structures (fixed rate, adjustable rate, and 
blended) and maturities (overnight to 30 years), and the FHLBanks provide asset/liability-management 
consulting to help members use products and maturities to manage interest rate and liquidity risk.   
Finally, access to FHLBank funding implicitly encourages members to reshape their balance sheets in 
ways that could lower credit risk.  Evidence about the cumulative impact of FHLBank activity on risk 
would help bank managers and bank supervisors distinguish between prudent and imprudent uses of 
advances.  
It is a particularly opportune time to assess the impact of FHLBank activity on bank risk.  In the 
past few years, the other housing government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), Freddie Mac and Fannie 
Mae, have come under fire for ineffective interest-rate hedges and irregular accounting practices (Frame, 
2004).  Freddie and Fannie have also drawn criticism for allegedly diverting housing subsidies to their 
shareholders and threatening the financial system with their explosive growth (CBO, 2004; Passmore, 
2003; Poole 2003).  Because the FHLBank System has also grown rapidly, and some FHLBanks have 
also suffered losses from ineffective hedges, advocates of stronger mortgage-GSE oversight have lumped 
the three together, arguing that one safety-and-soundness supervisor be given authority over Freddie, 
Fannie, and the FHLBanks (Carnell, 2004).  But the principal business line of the FHLBank system is 
“discounting” eligible mortgages, not securitizing conforming mortgages.  And the FHLBank System is 
organized as a cooperative, not a publicly traded firm.  These differences argue for a close look at the 
policy issues arising from FHLBank activity to ensure that reforms in mortgage-GSE governance 
appropriate for Freddie and Fannie are also appropriate for the FHLBank System. 
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Despite its potential public-policy importance, little research has been conducted on FHLBank 
activities.  To date, scientific study of the System has focused on the wisdom of their mortgage-
partnership program (Frame, 2003) and the implicit subsidy of community-bank lending (Craig and 
Thomson, 2003).  Some attempt has also been made to model the decisions of community banks to join 
the FHLBank System (Collender and Frizzell, 2002), to quantify the influence of FHLBank funding on 
the behavior of troubled thrifts (Ashley, Brewer, and Vincent, 1998), to assess the impact of Gramm-
Leach-Bliley on the solvency of the FHLBank System (Nickerson and Phillips, 2002), and to gauge the 
effect of FHLBank advances on the deposit-insurance fund (Bennett, Vaughan, and Yeager, 2005).  We 
are aware of no work on the impact of FHLBank membership and funding on bank risk.  To remedy this 
gap in the literature, we utilize quarterly financial and supervisory data to compare the risk profiles of 
members and nonmembers for the 1992-2000 sample period.  We then examine the relationship between 
dependence on advances and risk-taking among member banks over the same interval.  The evidence 
suggests liquidity and leverage risks rose modestly for members, but interest-rate risk declined somewhat.  
Credit risk and overall insolvency risk were largely unaffected.  Although these findings suggest that the 
cumulative impact of FHLBank membership and advances on bank risk is modest, we caution that the 
1990s constitute a period of robust economic growth and that serious moral-hazard problems could arise 
if leverage ratios revert to historical norms.  The policy implication is that bank supervisors consider 
levying a capital charge on heavy users of FHLBank advances, pending reform of deposit-insurance 
pricing.  
The remainder of the paper is organized in five parts.  Section 2 provides institutional background 
to facilitate assessment of the research question and strategy.  Section 3 offers a framework for analyzing 
the various influences of FHLBank activities on bank risk; section 4 attempts to quantify the cumulative 
impact of membership and advances on risk.  Section 5 interprets the results and explores policy 
implications.  Section 6 concludes.  
 3 
2.  A Primer on the FHLBank System 
The FHLBank System was the first housing GSE.
3  Congress established the System in 1932 to 
advance funds against mortgage collateral.  During the banking panics of the early 1930s, illiquidity 
produced insolvency in thousands of depository institutions.  Savings and loan associations and savings 
banks—the principal providers of housing finance—were particularly vulnerable because of the absence 
of a secondary market for mortgages.  The FHLBanks gave members access to ready cash.  The 
FHLBanks also enabled members to offer better terms on mortgage loans.  In the 1930s, originators 
typically held hold loans until maturity; consequently, mortgages typically took the form of three-to-five 
year non-amortizing balloons.  The FHLBanks provided a source of long-term stable funding, thereby 
facilitating separation of the credit and liquidity risks of mortgage lending.  Separation of these risks 
encouraged FHLBank members to originate more mortgages.
4  
Originally, only thrifts and insurance companies could join the FHLBank System, but Congress 
began broadening membership in the late 1980s.  The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) opened the System to commercial banks and credit unions with at 
least 10 percent of their assets in residential mortgage loans.
5  The Federal Home Loan Bank 
Modernization Act of 1999 (Title VI of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) further widened access by 
eliminating the 10 percent test for community financial institutions (CFIs).  The Act also permitted CFIs 
to pledge small business, small farm, and small agri-business loans against long-term advances, thereby 
making membership even more attractive.  As of December 2004, the FHLBank System boasted 8,131 
members—5,917 banks, 1,320 thrifts, 802 credit unions, and 92 insurance companies.  CFIs accounted 
                                                                  
3 Except where noted, institutional details about the FHLBank System and its history were drawn from GAO reports, CBO 
reports, individual FHLBank websites, the Federal Housing Finance Board website, Hoover (1952), and interviews with 
FHLBank System employees.    
4 Details on the pre-GSE mortgage market were taken from OFHEO (2003), Chapter 2, “The Development of the U.S. Secondary 
Mortgage Market.” 
5 “Residential mortgage loans” are defined as first- and junior-lien home mortgage loans, multifamily mortgage loans, 
manufactured housing loans, home equity loans, mortgage-backed securities, residential construction loans, dormitory, retirement 
home, nursing home, and single-room occupancy loans. 
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for 78 percent of total membership, though large banks hold over 30 percent of outstanding advances (that 
is, banks holding more than $500 million in assets in constant 1999 dollars). 
The FHLBank System comprises 12 member-owned banks, a centralized debt issuance facility 
(the Office of Finance) and a safety-and-soundness supervisor (the Federal Housing Finance Board).  
FHLBanks are located in Atlanta, Boston, Dallas, Des Moines, Chicago, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, New 
York, Pittsburgh, San Francisco, Seattle, and Topeka.  Each bank is a cooperative corporation, wholly 
owned by its members.  Members contribute capital by purchasing stock in their regional bank; in return 
they receive dividends and a wide range of financial products and services.  These products and services 
include advances, letters of credit, irrevocable lines of credit, interest-rate swaps, asset/liability-
management consulting and deposits.  Although some FHLBanks have begun to purchase conforming 
mortgages through the Mortgage Partnership Finance Program, the System’s primary business line is still 
provision of short- and long-term advances (Frame, 2003).   
The System covers the cost of its products and services by selling debt instruments, which are 
joint obligations of the 12 FHLBanks.  Buyers include mutual funds, commercial banks and government 
bodies—both in the United States and abroad.  As of June 2004, consolidated obligations summed to 
$816.3 billion or 95 percent of System liabilities.  On the other side of the balance sheet, advances 
outstanding totaled $564 billion, or 63 percent of assets.  The System also invests in obligations of the 
U.S. government and the other mortgage GSEs; as of June 2004, security holdings summed to $139.9 
billion, or 15.6 percent of assets.  The FHLBank System is not required to pay federal income tax, but it is 
required to set aside a portion of earnings to service Resolution Funding Corporation debt and to fund 
affordable housing initiatives.  
Circulars for FHLBank securities warn of the lack of a Treasury guarantee, but debt spreads 
suggest the capital markets have discounted this warning.  The Congressional Budget Office estimated an 
historical funding advantage of roughly 41 basis points on housing-GSE debt securities (CBO, 2001).  
The funding advantage derives, in part, from past actions by the federal government such as bailouts of 
two similar GSEs—the Farm Credit System in the 1980s and the Financing Corporation in the 1990s 
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(Leggett and Strand, 1997).  The consolidated obligations of the FHLBank System enjoy AAA ratings 
from Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s.  But even without the implicit backing of the Treasury, the 
System would enjoy a strong credit rating because of its remarkable credit risk record—no FHLBank has 
ever suffered a credit loss on an advance.   
3.  FHLBanks and Member Risk: The Theory 
Advances implicitly encourage risk taking because their price does not rise with the failure risk of 
the borrower.  At the same time, FHLBank products and services help members manage interest-rate and 
liquidity risk.  And access to FHLBank funding encourages members to reshape their balance sheets in 
ways that could lower credit risk.  So, in theory, FHLBank membership and advances could increase or 
decrease bank risk.  This section brings these arguments into sharper focus.  
Access to advances creates a classic moral-hazard problem.  When a depository institution 
assumes more risk, it must typically pay a higher default premium to uninsured, unsecured creditors.  
Insured depositors, in contrast, do not demand compensation for increasing failure risk because the FDIC 
stands ready to make them whole.  The resulting moral-hazard problem is well known (Merton, 1977).  
What is not well know is that FHLBanks, like insured depositors, face no credit risk and, consequently, 
have little incentive to charge more for advances when failure risk increases.  FHLBanks face no credit 
risk because of privileges conferred by their GSE status and monopoly position.
6  For example, 
FHLBanks insist on collateralization far in advance of that demanded by other secured creditors—the 
market value of collateral typically covers 125 to 170 percent of an advance and can go much higher.  
Moreover, FHLBanks are privy to confidential state and federal examination reports, so they can learn 
about deterioration in a member’s loan portfolio—and demand more collateral—before other creditors 
become aware of problems.  Finally, should a member fail and collateral prove insufficient, the exposed 
FHLBank can assert statutory lien priority on the other assets—thereby gaining priority over all 
                                                                  
6 FHLBanks have, of course, suffered losses for other reasons.  For example, the Federal Home Loan Bank of Seattle has recently 
been forced to suspend dividends and cut staff because of plunge in earnings, a plunge largely traceable to a lost bet on interest 
rates.  For more details see Shenn (2005). 
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unsecured creditors.
7  Because of this protection, no FHLBank has ever lost a penny on an advance.  It is 
rational, therefore, for an FHLBank to set an “all-in” price on advances—the collateral terms and interest 
rate—that is independent of the borrower’s failure risk.
8  Hence, the moral-hazard problem: banks can use 
advances to take risks, keep the upside, and shift the downside to someone else.
9  
As with insured deposits, the FDIC is the “someone else.”  If it were a private insurer, the FDIC 
would recalculate expected losses every time an FHLBank member borrowed advances.
10  The resulting 
change in deposit-insurance premiums would compensate for the absence of default-risk premiums on 
advances, thereby raising the marginal cost of risk-taking and removing the perverse incentive.  But the 
FDIC is not a private insurer, and its latitude to change premiums is limited by statute.  Premium 
schedules are currently set for six-month intervals, based on bank supervisory ratings, bank capital ratios, 
and the Bank Insurance Fund’s (BIF) designated reserve ratio.  As of December 2004, only 526 of 7,852 
(6.7 percent) BIF institutions paid any premium for deposit insurance, and the average annual assessment 
rate was just 0.11 basis points (FDIC, 2005).  Even by the FDIC’s own reckoning, the 27 basis-point 
spread between assessments on the safest and riskiest banks is inadequate to cover expected losses.   
Indeed, the FDIC estimates that the premiums necessary to cover average 1984-1999 losses range from 
3.7 basis points to 96.8 basis points (FDIC, 2001).  Academic research corroborates the need for a greater 
                                                                  
7 The Federal Reserve Discount Window, as well, makes collateralized loans and enjoys many of the same privileges as the 
FHLBanks.  There are two key differences, however.  First, Discount Loans are designed to enable banks to cover short-term 
payments imbalances that occur late in the business day.  FHLBank lending is predominately long-term.  Second, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) put strict limits on the ability of Federal Reserve Banks to 
loan to troubled financial institutions.  These differences show up in the data:  At year-end 2003, Discount Loans outstanding to 
commercial banks totaled $0.1 billion; advances outstanding to FHLBanks came to $240.8 billion. 
8 In theory, an FHLBank could price discriminate to maximize revenue, charging a price for advances just below the rate a 
member bank would have to pay in the capital markets.  But, as a cooperative, the System has put member goodwill above profit 
maximization.   
9 Member banks must, of course, hold eligible collateral to take down advances.  So an implicit cost of FHLBank funding is the 
opportunity cost of holding more pledgeable assets than a member bank otherwise would.  Evidence suggests, however, that this 
cost has not been large.  According to a recent FDIC survey of FHLBank members, the principal reason for taking down 
advances is to fund loan growth.  Reliance on advances rather than core deposits (which are insured and thus also carry no 
default-risk premium) implies the marginal cost of advances—including the opportunity cost of holding more pledgeable 
assets—is lower the marginal cost of core deposits.  In addition, FHLBank members report that another important motivation is 
leveraged growth, by which advances are used to purchase long-term mortgage-backed securities.  This strategy has been 
particularly attractive in recent years because of the unusually large spread between short- and long-term rates (Stark and Spears-
Read, 2004).  
10 Even if advances do not alter failure risk, they do subordinate the FDIC’s position—thereby increasing loss-given-failure.  So a 
private deposit insurer would recalculate expected losses with every change in advances outstanding.  For more discussion, see 
Bennett, Vaughan, and Yeager (2005). 
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spread in the premium structure.  (See Duffie, et al., 2003 and Falkenheim and Pennacchi, 2003, for 
example.). 
Discipline from other funding markets is unlikely to reduce moral hazard.  Irrespective of the 
level of uninsured deposits and FHLBank funding, uninsured unsecured bank creditors do have an 
incentive to demand higher default premiums as risk increases.  And empirical evidence does confirm a 
link between failure probability and default premiums on uninsured, unsecured bank debt.  (For example, 
see Hall, King, Meyer, and Vaughan, 2005; Morgan and Stiroh, 2001; Flannery, 1998; and Flannery and 
Sorescu, 1996; and Gilbert, 1990).  But, as Billett, Garfinkel and O’Neal (1998) have noted, discipline 
from uninsured, unsecured creditors is weakened by the availability of funds with no default premium.  
They document a tendency in the early 1990s for risky bank holding companies to escape market 
discipline by substituting insured deposits for market-priced debt.  FHLBank funding provides an easier 
escape from market discipline than insured deposits.  With unfettered access to world capital markets and 
an unlimited implicit Treasury guarantee, the FHLBank System faces an almost perfectly elastic supply 
curve for its debt.  And FHLBanks impose only two substantive constraints on member borrowing: the 
borrower must have eligible collateral and an acceptable supervisory rating.  Because FHLBanks will 
advance funds to purchase eligible assets—including assets in abundant supply such as mortgage-backed 
securities—the collateral constraint is not binding.  Moreover, in practice FHLBanks define an 
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“unacceptable” supervisory rating as a CAMELS 4 or 5 composite.
11  At year-end 2004, only 71  U.S. 
banks (0.92 percent) posted such a rating, and just 47 of those banks were FHLBank members.
12  
Figures 1 and 2, adapted from Billett, Garfinkel and O’Neal (B-G-ON), pull the various threads 
of the argument together.  Figure 1 depicts optimal lending and funding choices for a representative bank 
with access to core deposits (insured) and jumbo CDs (uninsured deposits).  The interest rate, r, appears 
on the vertical axis and the quantity of loans made and funds required, Q, appears on the horizontal axis.  
Following B-G-ON (who were drawing on Klein, 1971), the bank’s marginal revenue from booking 
loans, MRL, slopes downward reflecting the assumption that lending opportunities are restricted because 
of regulatory or expertise constraints.  The bank’s marginal cost curve for core deposits (MCID) slopes 
upward sloping because of retail adjustment costs.  The costs include marketing to attract the deposits and 
higher explicit or implicit interest rates that must be paid on all existing deposits.  We depict the marginal 
cost curve for uninsured deposits (MCUD) as perfectly elastic, reflecting the assumptions that jumbo CDs 
are homogeneous instruments priced in a national market, and each bank is a price-taker in that market 
(MCUD).  For simplicity, we assume initial failure risk of the bank is so low that the credit risk exposure 
of a jumbo-CD holder is comparable to the exposure of an FHLBank.   
Under these assumptions, the bank’s marginal cost of funding curve will be the darkened line 
ABCD.  Below r*, the market rate on uninsured deposits, the bank will fund with core deposits because 
they are relatively cheaper.  After the bank has raised OQID in core deposits, it will switch to jumbo CDs 
                                                                  
11 Under rules set forth in FDICIA, each U.S. commercial bank must be examined every 12 to 18 months.  On these 
examinations, six aspects of safety and soundness are reviewed—“C” for capital adequacy, “A” for asset quality, “M” for 
management competence, “E” for earnings strength, “L” for liquidity risk, and “S” for sensitivity to market risk.  At the 
conclusion of the exam, a grade of 1 (best) to 5 (worst) is awarded to each component.  Examiners then use the component scores 
to award a composite CAMELS rating for overall bank condition; the composite rating is also expressed on a 1 to 5 scale.  All 
federal and state bank supervisors have used this uniform framework to assign CAMEL ratings since 1978 (Reidhill and 
O’Keefe, 1997).   
12 The FHLBanks insist that new members boast satisfactory supervisory ratings and, as noted, will not advance funds to 
members with less than satisfactory ratings—without permission from the principal supervisor.  This policy derives from the 
Federal Home Loan Bank of 1932.  Prior to 1989, however, the FHLBank Board had principal supervisory responsibility for 
thrifts, so the safety-and-soundness constraint was not binding.  FIRREA stripped the System of supervisory power, so the 
constraint now has teeth, in theory.  But the FHLBanks do not revoke membership or call advances when members encounter 
financial trouble—a rational policy given the safeguards against credit losses.  The FHLBanks enjoy one other protection.   
Advances often carry sizable pre-payment penalties.  The FDIC as receiver is compelled to pay these fees “off the top.”  For 
example, when the $69 million-asset Bank of Alamo (Tennessee) failed in November 2002, the Federal Home Loan Bank of 
Cincinnati charged the FDIC $906,000, or 14%, for pre-paying $6.4 million of advances (Blackwell, 2003)  Pre-payment fees 
due all other bank creditors are lumped with general obligations further down the pecking order. 
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because they are now relatively cheaper.  The bank maximizes profits by equating the marginal cost of 
funds and the marginal revenue from loans at point C, with an interest rate of r* and a quantity of loans-
made/funds-raised of Q*.  Of the total amount lent (OQ*), core deposits cover OQID and jumbo CDs 
cover QIDQ*.   
Now suppose the bank undertakes risky activities that significantly increase failure probability.  
For simplicity, assume the additional risk is market risk, rather than credit risk, so the marginal revenue 
curve for loans is unaffected.  The marginal cost curve for core deposits, MCID, does not shift because 
insured depositors do not care about failure risk.  Jumbo-CD holders, however, will insist on 
compensation, so the MCUD will shift upward at every Q to r’—the interest rate hike from r* reflects the 
actuarially fair increase in the default premium.  The bank’s new marginal cost of funding curve will be 
the line AEFG.  The bank now maximizes profits at point F, lending OQ’ and funding with OQID’ insured 
deposits and QID’Q’ uninsured deposits.  The increase in failure risk leads to: (1) a reduction in the 
quantity of loans made and funds raised and (2) an increase in the proportion of loans funded with core 
deposits.  The jumbo-CD market does discipline the bank by reducing the optimal quantity of loans, but 
the effect is muted by the substitution towards insured funding.   
Now, suppose advances are available from a regional FHLBank at marginal cost MCADV.  
Assume that, apart from their secured status, advances are close substitutes for jumbo CDs—that is, they 
carry the same maturities, denominations, and pre-payment penalties.  MCADV is perfectly elastic because 
of the weak constraints on member borrowing and the easy placement of FHLBank System debt.  Before 
the increase in risk, the FHLBank faces the same default risk as jumbo-CD holders, so it will set an all-in 
rate on advances roughly equal to the going rate on jumbo CDs.  In the initial situation, the distribution of 
non-core funding between advances and uninsured deposits will depend on second order, non-price 
factors, such as the ability to use jumbo CDs to secure other business from the account holder.  Once 
again, suppose the bank undertakes risky activities, and MCUD shifts upward.  As before, the MCID does 
not shift because insured depositors face no default risk.  Because the lending FHLBank also faces no 
default risk, MCADV will not shift, and the marginal cost of funding curve will remain the darkened line 
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ABCD.  The optimal quantity of lending does not change, and the optimal volume of core deposits does 
not change.  The funding mix, however, does change—the bank substitutes advances for the only source 
of discipline, jumbo CDs.  Put another way, absent large business development opportunities with jumbo-
CD holders, uninsured deposits will fall from a positive level to zero.  The end result: the bank uses 
advances to escape discipline from the jumbo-CD market and continue lending at Q*. 
Consider one more case, depicted in figure 2, in which the bank assumes credit risk instead of 
market risk.  Specifically, imagine that a commercial real-estate (CRE) boom takes place in the bank’s 
market, and the marginal revenue curve for loans shifts to the right (from MRL to MR’L).  Imagine further 
that these CRE loans are speculative; they produce high non-current and charge-off rates.
13  Now suppose, 
for simplicity, that the increase in default premiums on jumbo CDs (r*r’) exactly equals the increase in 
revenue from the high-risk loans.  Put another way, the CRE loans now available have zero net present 
value if funded at the market jumbo-CD rate.  Absent access to FHLB funding, the increase in loan 
demand will not change the optimal quantity of loans.  Before the shifts in marginal revenue and cost, the 
bank maximizes profits at point C, lending OQ*; after the shift the banks optimizes at point F, also 
lending OQ*.  Again, the funding mix does change—as before the bank substitutes insured for uninsured 
deposits.  Before the shifts in marginal revenue and cost, loans are funded with OQID core deposits and 
QIDQ* jumbo CDs; after the shifts, loans are funded with OQID’ core deposits and QID’Q*.   
Now, imagine FHLBank advances are available, and the bank’s initial failure risk is trivial (so the 
rates on advances and jumbo CDs will be comparable).  Once again, a commercial real-estate boom shifts 
MRL to the right and significantly increases failure risk.  The availability of advances, which carry no 
default risk, keeps the bank’s marginal cost of funding curve equal to the darkened line ABCD  The bank 
will maximize profits at point D, lending OQ’ and funding with OQID core deposits and QIDQ’ non-core 
funding (advances and jumbo CDs).  The bank will fund the entire increase in loan demand, despite the 
high risk, because the FHLBank will make advances with no default-risk premium.   
                                                                  
13 Indeed, FDIC studies attribute much of the banking crisis of the late 1990s and early 1990s to heavy bank involvement in 
commercial real estate loans.  For more details, see Freund, et al. (1997). 
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Figures 1 and 2 are highly stylized, to be sure, and different assumptions about elasticities and 
risk premiums would produce slightly different results.  Still, these figures demonstrate the larger point: 
other things equal, FHLBank funding subsidizes risk-taking.  Absent strict supervisory oversight or 
actuarially fair deposit-insurance premiums—which would increase the marginal cost of risk taking with 
FHLB funding—member banks will be tempted to take excessive risks.  To be fair, these perverse 
incentives are not peculiar to FHLBank advances.  In theory, any bank could use insured deposits or 
discount loans (which are also collateralized) to exploit risk subsidies in deposit insurance.  In the 1980s, 
for example, many thrifts used brokered deposits to fund high-risk ventures (White, 1991) while risky 
banks turned to the Federal Reserve Discount Window (Schwartz, 1992).  In practice, however, banks can 
take risks with advances more cheaply than with other funding sources.  Other funding sources—core 
deposits, brokered deposits, and other secured funding—are subject to increasing marginal costs, due to 
either the explicit costs of raising additional funds or the implicit costs of greater supervisory oversight.
14  
As noted, the FHLBanks impose few constraints on member borrowing and raise funds with ease in world 
capital markets—so the marginal cost of funding with advances is flat in the face of increasing risk. 
Despite the moral-hazard problem, FHLB membership and funding advances could reduce bank 
risk.  As noted, the FHLBanks make advances against a broad range of collateral, thereby reducing the 
liquidity risk of member banks.  In addition, FHLBank members can use advances to manage interest-rate 
risk.  Unlike transactions deposits, advances carry finite maturities ranging from one day to thirty years, 
so funding with them can reduce confidence intervals around measured exposures.  More important, the 
flexible terms on advances make them a potentially effective tool for hedging exposures arising elsewhere 
on the balance sheet.  And the FHLBanks have asset/liability-management (ALM) experts on staff to 
advise members—at minimal cost—on strategies to meet target risk profiles.  Community financial 
institutions, which often lack the expertise necessary to hedge with interest-rate caps or floors, 
particularly value FHLBank hedging products and ALM consulting.  Finally, real-estate-backed loans—
                                                                  
14 For example, FIRREA and FDICIA proscribed the use of brokered deposits by weakly capitalized institutions, and examiners 
frown on them even in safe-and-sound institutions.  
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residential mortgages in particular—secure the majority of FHLBank advances.  Member banks either 
stock up on these loans ex ante to maintain an option on advances, or purchase them ex post with 
advances as part of a leveraged-growth strategy.  Either way, FHLBank members have an incentive to 
alter their portfolio mix in favor of loans with very low credit risk.
15  Between 1991 and 2000, for 
example, the net charge-off rate for real-estate-backed loans (apart from commercial real-estate loans) 
averaged 0.14 percent.  The charge-off rate for the remainder of the loan portfolio averaged 1.0 percent.  
So, ultimately, the net effect of FHLBank membership and advances on bank risk is an empirical issue.  
4.  FHLBanks and Member-Bank Risk-Taking: The Evidence 
In this section, we assess the effects of FHLBank membership and advances on commercial bank 
risk.  We treat membership and advances separately because each may have a separate effect on risk.  
Membership carries an option on advances and that option will influence bank behavior irrespective of 
whether it is exercised.  In addition, new members often wait for a considerable period before taking 
down an advance.  Between year-end 1992 and 2000, for example, the median number of quarters 
between the time that banks joined an FHLBank and the date of the first advance was two.  On average, 
banks waited a full year after membership to draw their first advance, and ten percent of members waited 
nearly three years.  Our research strategy also tests and controls for adverse selection.  Because 
membership is voluntary, the riskiest banks may have joined the System to evade market discipline.   
For the empirical analysis, we drew on three data sources: the Federal Housing Finance Board, 
the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, and the National Information Center of the 
Federal Reserve System.  We obtained most of the income and balance sheet data from the Reports of 
Condition and Income (Call Reports), which are warehoused by the Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council.  We obtained data on FHLBank membership and advances from the Federal 
                                                                  
15 Of course, banks could use FHLBank funding to make CRE loans, which would increase credit risk.  Even if the net effect 
were a reduction in credit risk, as Demsetz and Strahan (1997) have noted, relaxing constraints might simply induce member 
banks to assume more risk.  More concretely, suppose an FHLBank member has a target risk level.  Then, that bank might 
respond to an FHLBank-induced decline in interest-rate, liquidity, or credit risk by taking more risk in these or other areas.  
Again, the cumulative impact of FHLBank activity on bank risk is ultimately an empirical issue.  
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Housing Finance Board because.  (These data were not available on the call reports before 2001.)  Finally, 
we obtained supervisory ratings from the confidential National Information Center (NIC) database.  Our 
data set includes quarterly observations for all U.S. commercial banks over an eight-year period, from 
end-of-year 1992 to end-of-year 2000, and includes 316,538 observations.16  Due to consolidation, the 
number of commercial banks decreased during the sample period, from 11,365 at year-end 1992 to 8,255 
at year-end 2000. 
 
4.1.  Composite and Specific Measures of Bank Risk 
We analyze the effects of FHLBank membership and advances with a range of measures of bank 
risk for members and nonmembers.  We examine composite measures, which condense a wide array of 
risks into a single number such as the probability of failure, and specific risk measures, which isolate a 
source of risk such as loan quality.  The composite measures indicate whether members are, in an overall 
sense, riskier than nonmembers.  The specific risk measures help pinpoint the sources of any differences 
in overall risk.  
For our principal measure of composite risk, we rely on output from an econometric model of 
financial distress.  The Federal Reserve uses two econometric models in off-site surveillance, collectively 
known as SEER, the System to Estimate Examination Ratings.  The first model (the SEER risk rank 
model) combines financial ratios to estimate the probability that a given bank will fail within the next two 
years.  The second model (the SEER rating model) estimates the CAMELS rating that would be awarded 
based on the bank’s latest balance sheet and income statement information.  Historically, the SEER 
framework has performed quite well in identifying potential bank risk.  Cole, Cornyn, and Gunther (1995) 
demonstrate that the SEER model outperformed a surveillance approach based on supervisory screens, 
both as a predictor of failures and as an identifier of troubled institutions.  Gilbert, Meyer, and Vaughan 
                                                                  
16 We chose to end our sample period at year-end 2000 rather than extend it to later years because by that time more than two-
thirds of banks had joined the FHLB System and the incentive to join early to avoid market discipline had clearly diminished.  In 
addition, continuous monitoring by bank regulators since 2000 shows that the relationship between advances and bank risk has 
not changed materially. 
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(2001) show that both SEER models perform on par with a CAMELS downgrade model as a tool for 
flagging downgrades in supervisory ratings.  We use the predicted failure probabilities from the SEER 
risk rank model to measure the composite risk of the banks in our sample.  To produce the predicted 
failure probabilities, we obtained the coefficients from the SEER risk rank model, which are kept 
confidential, from the Board of Governors. 
To supplement the econometric measure of composite risk, we also look at the growth rate of 
total assets for members and nonmembers.  In the past, rapid asset growth has often signaled declining 
underwriting standards, a lax approach to risk management, or outright fraud—all of which can lead to 
failure.  For example, between year-end 1982 and year-end 1985, total assets in the S&L industry grew by 
56 percent, more than twice the growth rate of savings banks and commercial banks over the same period.  
Later, the fastest growing thrifts dominated the list of failures (Moysich, 1997).  This perceived link 
between rapid growth and failure risk led the FDIC to develop a surveillance system centered on asset 
growth, the Growth Monitoring System or GMS, in the mid-1980s (Reidhill and O’Keefe, 1997; King, 
Nuxoll and Yeager, 2005).  Although econometric models based on financial ratios currently play a 
dominant role in off-site surveillance at all three Federal bank supervisors, many individual surveillance 
analysts and field examiners still look at asset growth for clues about impending safety-and-soundness 
problems.  
Unlike composite risk measures, specific risk measures identify the particular areas of bank risk 
that might be affected by Home Loan Bank membership and advances.  We rely on two ratios from each 
risk category, which include leverage risk, liquidity risk, credit risk, and interest rate risk.  These ratios 
are commonly used by bank examiners and supervisors to assess a bank’s risk profile.   
Leverage risk is the risk that losses will exceed capital, rendering a bank insolvent.  We measure 
leverage risk with total equity as a percentage of total assets, and total qualifying capital allowable under 
regulatory guidelines divided by credit-risk-weighted measures of assets and off-balance sheet activity.  
This risk-weighted equity measure is available beginning in 1996.  Lower levels of both equity ratios 
indicate higher leverage risk.   
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Liquidity risk is the risk that a bank will be unable to fund loan commitments or meet withdrawal 
demands at a reasonable cost.  We assess liquidity risk with noncore funding as a percentage of assets, 
and loans as a percentage of core deposits.  “Core” funding includes deposits that are relatively 
insensitive to the difference between the interest rate paid by the bank and the market rate, such as 
checking accounts, savings accounts, and small time deposits.  In contrast, “noncore” funding—which 
includes brokered deposits, jumbo certificates of deposit (CDs over $100,000), and Home Loan Bank 
advances—can be quite sensitive to interest rate differentials.  Although, strictly speaking, advances will 
not flee the bank like other noncore funding, they do reprice in step with market rates at maturity or on 
repricing dates.  In addition, advances with embedded options can create funding uncertainty.  Higher 
values for these liquidity ratios imply greater liquidity risk. 
Credit risk is the risk that a borrower will fail to make promised interest and principal payments.  
We measure credit risk with the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans, and the ratio of commercial 
real estate loans to total assets.  Nonperforming loans—loans that are more than 89 days past due or are 
no longer accruing interest—are highly correlated with future charge-offs.  Commercial real estate loans 
consist of construction and land development loans and loans secured by nonfarm, nonresidential 
properties.  Historically, the default rate on commercial real estate loans has exceeded the default rates on 
most other loans.  For example, at the beginning of our sample period in 1992, commercial real estate 
loans were charged-off (net of recoveries) at a rate of 2.1 percent, compared with a rate of 1.3 percent for 
all loans.  This charge-off rate was topped only by the 4.76 percent charge-off rate on credit card loans.  
Moreover, in every year between 1980 and 1993, the ratio of commercial real estate loans to total assets 
was higher for banks that subsequently failed than for banks that did not fail (Freund, et al., 1997).  An 
increase in both these ratios suggests higher credit risk.  In addition, an increase in commercial real estate 
holdings would suggest that member banks are not using advances to reduce their holdings of relatively 
risky loans. 
Interest rate risk is the risk that changes in interest rates or security prices will reduce bank 
income and the market value of bank equity.  For most banks, interest rate risk arises from mismatches in 
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the duration of assets and liabilities.  Unfortunately, call report data do not allow precise estimation of 
asset and liability duration for our entire sample.  Instead, we rely on the one-year GAP, which offers a 
crude estimate of yearly earnings at risk due to interest rate movements.  One-year GAP is the absolute 
value of the difference between assets and liabilities that reprice within one year, expressed as a 
percentage of total assets.  Currently, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System uses a 
duration-based, Economic Value of Equity (EVE) model to measure interest rate risk exposure (Embersit 
and Houpt, 1991; Houpt and Wright, 1996).  This model simulates the impact of a 200 basis point interest 
rate increase on the bank’s EVE relative to the bank’s assets; higher absolute values indicate higher levels 
of interest rate risk.  Recent research by Sierra and Yeager (2004) shows that this model accurately ranks 
banks by their interest rate sensitivity.  Data for the EVE measure of interest rate risk, however, are 
available only after 1997.  Increases in GAP or EVE would suggest that interest rate sensitivity is 
increasing despite access to advances. 
 
4.2.  Economic Significance Benchmarks 
When analyzing differences in composite and specific risk ratios, we pay careful attention to the 
distinction between statistical significance and economic significance (McCloskey and Ziliak, 1996).   
Tests of statistical significance determine the likelihood that differences in risk measures are the product 
of chance.  Tests of economic significance, in contrast, determine whether observed differences are large 
enough to matter for policy purposes.  Large samples can deliver statistically significant differences that 
are economically unimportant.  For example, it is possible that a hypothetical difference between an 
average equity ratio of, say, 10 percent for Home Loan Bank members and an average 10.05 percent for 
nonmembers is statistically significant, given the large number of observations in our sample.  Yet, most 
bank economists and supervisors would conclude that such a small difference in capital ratios, 
particularly when capital ratios are so high, is not economically important.  
We use differences in median risk ratios based on CAMELS ratings to assess economic 
significance.  Under rules set forth in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 
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1991 (FDICIA), examiners must visit each U.S. commercial bank every 12 to 18 months.  On these visits, 
they assess six aspects of safety and soundness—“C” for capital adequacy, “A” for asset quality, “M” for 
management competence, “E” for earnings strength, “L” for liquidity risk, and “S” for sensitivity to 
market risk.  At the conclusion of the exam, a grade of 1 (best) to 5 (worst) is awarded to each 
component.  Examiners then use the component scores to award a composite CAMELS rating for overall 
bank condition.  The composite rating is also expressed on a 1 to 5 scale.  All federal and state bank 
supervisors have used the same uniform framework to assign CAMEL ratings since 1978 (Reidhill and 
O’Keefe, 1997).  Banks with 1 or 2 composite ratings are considered safe-and-sound.  At year-end 2000, 
nearly 94 percent of all banks maintained composite ratings of 1 or 2.  Banks with composite ratings 
greater than 2 are considered less than satisfactory; these banks face considerable supervisory pressure—
in the form of informal and formal enforcement actions—to regain safety and soundness.  
Because supervisors consider a drop from a CAMELS 2 rating to a 3 rating a significant change 
in financial condition, we use the differences in risk ratios for 2- and 3-rated institutions as benchmarks to 
evaluate economic significance.  Table 2 displays the median values of these risk ratios over our sample.  
When assessing the differences in composite risk measures for Home Loan Bank members and 
nonmembers, we look to the differences in the risk measure across composite 2- and composite 3-rated 
banks.  For example, over the eight-year sample, the median failure probability for composite 2-rated 
institutions was 0.04 percent, and the median failure probability for composite 3-rated institutions was 
0.31 percent.  Thus, we would consider a 27 basis point difference in failure probabilities between 
members and nonmembers to be economically large.  When assessing the differences in specific risk 
measures for members and nonmembers, we look to the differences in the same measure across the 
component rating for 2- and 3-rated banks.  For example, the median bank with 2-rated asset quality had a 
nonperforming loan to total loan ratio of 1.02 percent; the median bank with 3-rated asset quality had a 
nonperforming loan ratio of 2.10 percent.  We would, therefore, consider a 108 basis point difference in 
non-performing loan ratios for members and nonmembers to be economically significant.  Asset growth is 
the only economic significance benchmark with the unexpected sign.  In fact, 3-rated banks have lower 
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asset growth than 2-rated banks, possible because regulators impose growth restraints on 3-rated 
institutions.  
 
4.3.  Adverse Selection Incentives 
We begin our assessment of the impact of Home Loan Bank membership on risk-taking by 
exploring the adverse selection incentives.  That is, banks with relatively high risk might use FHLB 
funding to avoid market discipline.  Risky banks that must pay above-market rates for uninsured funding 
would eagerly replace that funding with relatively low-cost advances. 
We investigate the importance of the adverse selection incentives by using a Cox proportional 
hazards model to estimate a bank’s duration of time until it joins the FHLB.  These models are commonly 
used in medicine to estimate, say, the change in the duration of a patient’s life after receiving a particular 
treatment.  The central idea in this banking context is that a riskier bank might choose to join the FHLB 
earlier than safer banks, reducing the bank’s duration as a nonmember.  The proportional hazards model is 
an ideal approach because it accounts for censored observations and the non-normal distribution of the 
dependent variable.  Certain observation of nonmember banks are censored because such banks leave the 
sample early (e.g. mergers) or the sample period ends before they join the FHLB.  Moreover, the 
dependent variable—the number of years after the fourth quarter of 1992 that the bank remains a 
nonmember—cannot be negative because the bank drops out of the sample the quarter after it joins the 
FHLB. 
We employ the Cox proportional hazards model by using quarterly data between 1992 and 2000, 
regressing each bank’s duration as a nonmember on a set of risk and control variables. 












We exclude from the risk variables the risk-based capital ratio and the change in EVE to assets 
because of the high numbers of missing observations.
17  Control variables include the log of total assets, a 
CFI indicator variable (with a value of one for banks that qualify as CFIs), and ROA, which controls for 
the risk-return tradeoff that banks face.  If high-risk banks have stronger incentives to join the FHLB, that 
risk may be at least partially offset by high returns. 
The regression results, reported in Table 3, suggest that adverse selection incentives are weak.  
Only two of the eight risk coefficients are statistically significant with the expected signs.  A positive sign 
suggests that the membership event is more likely to occur.  Banks with lower ratios of equity to assets 
and higher levels of nonperforming loans are more likely to join the FHLB than other banks.  All the 
remaining risk ratios, however, indicate that lower-risk banks are more likely to join the FHLB.  In 
particular, banks with higher asset growth and higher ratios of commercial real estate are less likely to 
join the FHLB.  Banks with higher levels of liquidity and interest rate risk are also less likely to become 
members. 
To interpret the economic significance of the coefficients, we examine the hazard ratios.  These 
ratios, reported in the second-to-last column of the table, are computed by taking the exponentials of the 
coefficients.  A hazard ratio of 1.50, for example, would indicate that a one unit change in the 
independent variable makes the event (FHLB membership) 1.5 times as likely to occur.  The adjusted 
hazard ratio is the likelihood of membership given an economically significant change—the CAMELS 
benchmark change—in the risk variable. 
Most of the adjusted hazard ratios are near one, reflecting small economic significance.  The 
largest ratio is the nonperforming loan to total loan ratio, which shows that a bank with a 108 basis-point 
increase in nonperforming loans is 1.02 times as likely to join the FHLB.  Conversely, banks with 
economically significant increases in the absolute value of one-year GAP and noncore funding to total 
assets are only 0.95 times as likely to become members.  In sum, the evidence suggests that the adverse 
selection incentives to join the FHLB are unimportant. 
                                                                  
17 We also ran the hazard-model regression including these variables.  Results are qualitatively similar. 
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One potential criticism of the hazard-model approach to adverse selection is that banks may have 
ramped up risk after 1989—the year that the option to join the FHLB was granted—knowing that they 
could exercise the option to join if they ran into liquidity problems.  The hazard regression model, 
however, includes bank observations after 1989.  As a robustness check to assessing the importance of 
adverse selection, we employ a logit model to predict FHLB membership.  Recall that banks first had an 
opportunity to join the FHLB in 1989 following implementation of FIRREA.  By year-end 1992, 1,284 
banks exercised that option.  By simply regressing FHLB membership status in 1992 (the first year that 
we have data on bank membership) on bank risk variables in 1992, we mix adverse selection and moral 
hazard incentives because some banks may have joined the FHLB early in the three-year period and 
increased risk further.  To control for moral hazard incentives, we define a “joiner” (“nonjoiner”) as a 
bank that was (not) an FHLB member by year-end 1992, and we regress membership status in 1992 on 
banks' risk ratios from year-end 1989.  By using risk ratios from 1989, we reduce the possibility that 
banks used FHLB advances to increase risk between 1989 and 1992.  The logit takes the following form: 












1989 , 1992 ,
1 ) (
 
       0 if the bank did not join the FHLB by year-end 1992; 
 where  Joiner = 
      1 if the bank was an FHLB member by year-end 1992, and 
  F(.)  =   the logistic transformation. 
The risk and control variables are identical to those in the hazard regression above. 
As with the hazard model, the logit regression indicates that adverse selection incentives are 
weak.  Table 4 reports the coefficients.  Joiners do have faster asset growth and higher leverage risk than 
nonjoiners, but they also have lower failure probabilities and lower credit risk.  Liquidity ratios are mixed.  
The positive coefficient on the ratio of total loans to core deposits indicates that joiners have higher 
liquidity risk than nonjoiners, yet the negative coefficient on noncore funding to total assets indicates the 
opposite result.  Finally, interest rate risk as reflected by the one-year GAP is statistically insignificant. 
 21 
 Economic significance is difficult to interpret from the coefficient estimates, therefore we also 
report in Table 4 an adjusted odds ratios.  This adjusted odds ratio computes the odds of joining the 
FHLB given an economically significant change in the risk ratio as defined by the CAMELS benchmark 
differences.  The evidence indicates that the loan to core deposit ratio is the most economically important 
risk difference between joiners and nonjoiners.  A bank with a loan to core deposits ratio that is 8.45 
percentage points greater than another bank has an odds of joining the FHLB that is 1.11 times that of the 
other bank.  Similarly, a bank with an equity to asset ratio 79 basis points higher than another bank is 0.95 
times as likely to join as the other bank.  In contrast, a bank with a nonperforming loan ratio 108 basis 
points above another bank is only 0.92 times as likely as the other bank to join the FHLB.  In sum, the 
adverse selection incentives for banks to evade market discipline by substituting core deposits with 
advances are weak. 
  
4.4.  Risk-Taking Incentives After Membership: Matched Pair Analysis 
After banks joined the FHLB, moral hazard incentives might have induced them to take on 
additional risk by funding that risk with advances.  Conversely, advances may have given banks an 
opportunity to reduce their interest rate sensitivity and to focus more heavily on residential mortgage 
lending.  How important are these effects?  We use matched pairs to answer this question.  Matched pairs 
is a valuable tool to measure risk effects because it controls for the adverse selection bias. 
We followed the risk profiles for matched pairs of banks that were about to join the Home Loan 
Bank System and peer banks that would not join for at least eight quarters.  Specifically, at time t we 
matched each sample bank that would join the System by time t+1 with a nonjoiner that had at least a 
five-year operating history.  To ensure a close match, we paired each joiner with a nonjoiner that (1) 
operated in the same Home Loan Bank District, (2) served a similar banking market (urban/rural), (3) 
held at least two percent of its assets in mortgages, and (4) maintained the same composite CAMELS 
rating.  We further reduced the adverse selection bias by insisting that peer composite and specific risk 
ratios as of time t were similar for joiners and nonjoiners.  Among banks that matched up with joiners in 
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all these respects, we selected the bank that was closest in asset size to the Home Loan Bank member and 
designated it the peer bank.  Then, we traced changes in the composite and specific risk measures for 
joiners and peer nonjoiners over a two-year period.  Table 5 compares the two-year changes in the various 
risk measures for matched pairs of joiners and nonjoiners.  
The overall risk of Home Loan Bank joiners increased relative to peer nonmember banks during 
the first two years of membership, though the differences were not large.  Two-year changes in failure 
probabilities for joiners and nonjoiners were indistinguishable statistically.  Changes in asset growth gave 
somewhat stronger evidence of a membership effect.  Two years after joining, members increased their 
annual growth by 2.44 percentage points while peer nonmember banks decreased their growth by 1.11 
percentage points. 
Turning to specific risk measures, members increased leverage risk somewhat relative to 
nonmembers in the two years after joining.  Equity as a percentage of assets slipped by nearly 5 basis 
points at joiner banks but climbed by 35 basis points at peer banks.  This 39 basis-point difference is 
statistically significant at the one-percent level and constitutes 50 percent of the economic significance 
benchmark.  Moreover, risk-based capital as a percentage of risk-weighted assets tumbled 101 basis 
points at joiner banks over the first two years of membership; over the same time horizon, the average 
risk-based capital ratio at peer banks fell by only 14 basis points.  This 87 basis point difference is, again, 
significant at the one-percent level and equal to 142 percent of the economic significance benchmark.   
The two measures of liquidity risk also provide evidence of a modest link between membership 
and risk-taking.  Members increased their reliance on noncore funding by 1.85 percentage points relative 
to nonmembers.  This difference is statistically significant and is 71 percent of the economic significance 
benchmark.  Although the loan-to-core deposit ratio climbed at both joiners and nonjoiners, the ratio for 
members rose by a much larger margin (7.59 percentage points) than the ratio for nonmembers (4.37)—a 
difference that is statistically significant and more than one-third of the economic significance 
benchmark.  
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The specific measures of credit risk did not show a strong membership effect.  The 3 basis point 
difference in nonperforming loans to total loans between the members and nonmembers was statistically 
insignificant.  Commercial real estate as a percentage of total assets did rise by 1.44 percentage points at 
joining banks, but the ratio rose as well for nonjoiners—by 1.06 percentage points.  This 39-basis point 
difference, while statistically significant at the one-percent level, amounted to 32 percent of the economic 
significance benchmark.  The increase in commercial real estate lending at joiners, however, suggests that 
member banks are not using advances to shift out of historically riskier assets. 
The interest rate risk measures offered some evidence of an impact of membership on bank risk-
taking.  Joiners decreased their one-year GAP ratios by an average of 26 basis points, compared with an 
increase of 48 basis points for peer nonmembers.  The 74 basis point difference was statistically 
significant but equal to just one-fifth of the benchmark for economic significance.  When interest rate risk 
was measured by relative changes in the EVE, a more comprehensive gauge, no statistically or 
economically discernible differences emerged between the two groups. 
The matched-pair evidence suggests that between 1992 and 2000, commercial banks responded 
only modestly to the risk-taking incentives arising from access to advances and underpriced deposit 
insurance.  Leverage and liquidity risks increased somewhat, and banks used advances to increase their 
holdings of commercial real estate.  However, interest rate sensitivity declined modestly following FHLB 
membership. 
 
4.5.  Risk-Taking Evidence From Drawing Advances 
As noted, Home Loan Bank funding and underpriced deposit insurance can combine to subsidize 
risk-taking implicitly.  All other things equal, the size of this subsidy increases with bank risk.  The 
subsidy increases because the value of an option on funding at a pre-specified risk premium increases as 
overall bank risk increases (Thakor, 1982; Thakor, Hong, and Greenbaum, 1981).  Evidence of increased 
risk-taking behavior, therefore, may show up more clearly when the sample is partitioned by dependence 
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on advances rather than with membership.  Alternatively, banks that use advances more heavily may 
reduce their interest rate sensitivity and reliance on historically risky assets. 
To look for a link between risk and dependence on advances, we estimated a set of ordinary-least-
squares, fixed-effects panel regressions on member banks.  Specifically, we estimated the following 
equation:  
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where Riskit is the composite or specific risk measure for bank i at time t, Advancesi,t-k is the ratio of Home 
Loan Bank advances to total assets of bank i at time t-k, Timet is a vector of quarterly dummy variables 
that take a value of 1 in quarter t and 0 otherwise, and Sizet-8 is the log of total assets of bank i at time t-8.  
We use advances lagged five to eight quarters rather than contemporaneous advances because changes in 
advances affect many of our risk measures concurrently through accounting identities.  For example, a 
dollar in new Home Loan Bank advances increases total assets, which, all else equal, decreases a bank’s 
equity to assets ratio.  This lag structure reduces the correlation between advances and the error term.  
Time dummies capture differences in bank risk over time due to changing business cycle conditions.  We 
use a lagged measure of bank size because advances endogenously influence contemporaneous bank size.  
We exclude Size as a control variable in the probability of failure regression because the SEER risk rank 
model uses size as an explanatory variable.  The regression results appear in Table 6.18
Our approach to assessing the economic significance of coefficient estimates differs slightly from 
the approach we used in the membership analysis.  Here, we compute the percentage point change in the 
summed advances-to-assets ratio needed to bring about a change in the benchmark difference in 
CAMELS composite or component ratings.  For example, the coefficient on advances to assets when 
regressed on equity to total assets is -0.033.  Because the economic benchmark for equity to assets is -79 
basis points, it would take a 24.1 percentage point increase (-79/-0.033) in the ratio of advances to assets 
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to bring about a decrease in equity equal to the economic benchmark.  Hence, lower numbers denote 
greater economic significance.  A useful rule of thumb is to consider economic significance values below 
15 to be economically large because most banks can increase without difficulty their ratios of advances to 
assets by 15 percentage points. 
The regressions offer no evidence of a link between composite risk and dependence on Home 
Loan Bank advances.  The coefficient on failure probability is statistically indistinguishable from zero, 
and the asset growth variable is negative, suggesting that banks with heavier reliance on advances grow 
more slowly. 
Credit and interest rate risk are also unaffected by banks’ use of advances.  Although the 
coefficient on nonperforming loans is positive and statistically significant at the one percent level, it 
would take a 139.5 percentage point change in the advances-to-assets ratio to bring about an economically 
significant increase in the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans.  In addition, the coefficient on 
commercial real estate to total assets is negative, suggesting that member banks substitute away from 
these loans.  Interest rate risk also seems to fall as bank increase reliance on advances.  Both the one-year 
GAP and the change in EVE to assets ratios are negative, although only the GAP coefficient is 
statistically significant.  Again, the evidence suggests that banks have used advances to modestly reduce 
their interest rate sensitivity.  
The specific measures of leverage and liquidity risk do offer evidence of a modest increase in 
risk-taking.  An increase in the advances to assets ratio leads to statistically significant declines in both 
capital ratios.  Moreover, the economic significance of the risk-based capital coefficient is quite large; an 
11.9 percentage point increase in the advances-to-assets ratio is all that is required to bring about the 
economic significance benchmark change.  Liquidity ratios also weaken as dependence on advances 
increases, but only the relationship between advances and dependence on noncore funding seems at all 
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
18 As a robustness check to the panel regression approach, we ran equation (3) as a series of quarterly cross-sectional regressions.  
This approach allows us to observe any trends in the coefficients through time.  The coefficients (not reported) fluctuate 
somewhat from year to year but they show no discernable pattern in bank risk-taking.  
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large—it would take an 8.5 percentage point increase in the noncore-funding-to-total-assets ratio to 
produce a change equal to the benchmark for economic significance.  
As robustness checks, we tried several different specifications of the regression equation.  In 
place of advances to total assets lagged five-to-eight quarters, we used advances to total assets lagged 
one-to-eight quarters.  Not surprisingly, the statistical and economic significance of the leverage and 
liquidity risk coefficients were stronger than the coefficients derived from the regressions using just the 
five-to-eight quarter lags.  Composite and credit risk coefficients, however, were weaker, reflecting the 
declining percentage of problem loans that accompany asset growth driven by advances.  We also tried a 
two-stage least squares approach, instrumenting the four-quarters lagged advances-to-total-assets ratio 
with five-to-eight quarters lagged advances and time dummies.  The resulting coefficients were similar to 
those obtained with ordinary least squares.   
Overall, the regression analysis suggests that dependence on advances has had only a modest 
impact on risk at commercial banks.  Leverage and liquidity risks increase somewhat while credit risk and 
interest rate sensitivity decrease. 
 
5.  Explaining the Evidence: Where is the increase in risk-taking?  
The evidence suggests that Home Loan Bank membership and advances have had little impact on 
risk-taking at banks.  The strongest evidence of moral hazard shows up in our measures of leverage and 
liquidity risk.  Yet one could argue that banks must pursue leveraged growth strategies to survive and that 
traditional supervisory measures of liquidity are obsolete.  In addition, other risk measures decrease with 
membership and/or advances. 
We believe that the high charter values of banks over our sample period account for the small 
increase in risk-taking.  Keeley (1990) has theorized that high charter values deter bankers from 
exploiting defects in the pricing of deposit insurance because the owners cannot sell the charter once the 
bank is declared insolvent.  Well-capitalized banks with a strong earnings horizon are less likely to take 
imprudent risks because the owners have more of their own money at risk.  Keeley adduced evidence that 
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risk-taking at bank holding companies increased as charter values declined in the 1970s and 1980s in 
response to branching deregulation that intensified bank competition.  Despite the erosion of banks’ 
market power, the unprecedented economic expansion of the 1990s produced capital ratios (a proxy for 
charter value) that are high by historical standards: the average equity-to-asset ratio for banks was 10.08 
percent between 1992 and 2000, 108 basis points above the average equity ratio in the 1984-89 period.  
Moreover, fewer than 0.58 percent of banks had leverage ratios below the 5 percent threshold for well-
capitalized banks set by FDICIA in the same 1992-2000 period. 
Although bank capital positions are currently strong, these ratios can deteriorate quickly, 
especially in the current competitive banking environment.  Indeed, banks’ capital positions declined 
rapidly between 1984 and 1987.  Supervisors consider banks with equity-to-asset ratios less than 2 
percent to be critically undercapitalized.  At year-end 1984, just 55 of the 14,390 banks had capital ratios 
below 2 percent; by year-end 1987, 244 banks (1.80 percent) were critically undercapitalized.  If a serious 
decline in capital positions were to occur, reflecting diminished charter values, banks could be tempted to 
use Home Loan Bank funding to grow their way out of trouble.  Looking at the Home Loan Bank 
borrowing by thrifts in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Ashley et. al. (1998) found just this pattern.  They 
found that advances outstanding to thrifts ballooned in the late 1980s as the industry sank deeper and 
deeper into trouble.  More to the point, financially distressed thrifts borrowed more from the Home Loan 
Bank System than financially stronger thrifts.  Finally, the advances-to-asset ratios at thrifts that were 
later resolved well exceeded the ratios at thrifts that were not resolved.  
Other researchers provide historical examples of moral hazard incentives that seemed to have 
limited effects on risk early on, but eventually led to financial distress.  Wheelock et al. (1995) studies the 
voluntary Kansas state deposit insurance system, which began operating in 1909.  The authors attribute 
the lower capital to asset ratios at insured banks as weak evidence of adverse selection and moral hazard 
effects.  Nevertheless, the system operated for 20 years before dissolving following a collapse in farm 
output prices in the mid–1920s.  Insured banks failed at a rate of 4.6 percent—twice the failure rate of 
state uninsured banks.  Grossman (1992) studies savings and loans in Chicago and Milwaukee following 
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the introduction of national deposit insurance.  He finds that moral hazard emerged gradually at insured 
thrifts.  Specifically, it took about five years for insured thrifts’ risk-taking to surpass the risk of uninsured 
thrifts.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
In the last several years, commercial banks have relied on Federal Home Loan Bank advances to 
help plug the gap between loan growth and core deposit growth.  The increasing reliance is a potential 
safety and soundness concern because access to advances can undermine market discipline, and the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation cannot raise premiums sufficiently to deter risk-taking. 
Using quarterly income and balance sheet data between 1992 and 2000, we assess the effect of 
Home Loan Bank membership on bank risk.  We also examine the relationship between advances and risk 
among member banks.  The evidence suggests that Home Loan Bank members do exhibit somewhat 
riskier leverage and liquidity profiles than nonmembers and that risk does increase with dependence on 
advances.  But, the differences, thus far at least, do not appear to be large.  In addition, member banks 
have lower interest rate sensitivity and no significant change in overall risk. 
We believe that high charter values at commercial banks throughout the 1990s have kept risk-
taking in check.  Because charter value can deteriorate quickly in a highly competitive banking 
environment, we argue that bank supervisors should remain vigilant.  In a low-charter-value environment, 
only careful monitoring by state and federal supervisors can prevent distressed banks from responding to 
the moral hazard incentives associated with Home Loan Bank funding and underpriced deposit insurance.   
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 33December-92 December-00 Percentage Change
Thrift Institutions
         Number of members 2,291 1,547 -32.5%
         % of all thrift institutions 95.9% 97.4%
Large Commercial Banks              
(>$500 million, 2000 dollars)
         Number of members 117 545 365.8%
         % of all large commercial banks 16.3% 79.7%
Community Banks                      
(<$500 million, 2000 dollars)
         Number of members 1,167 5,083 335.6%
         % of all community banks 11.0% 67.3%
Total Members 3,624 7,777 114.6%
December-92 December-00 Percentage Change
Thrift Institutions 
        Advances ($Mill.) 72,331 254,900 252.4%
        Percent of Total Advances 91.8% 58.2%
Large Commercial Banks*              
(>$500 million, 2000 dollars)
        Advances ($Mill.) 4,395 140,470 3,096.1%
        Percent of Total Advances 5.6% 32.1%
Community Banks                      
(<$500 million, 2000 dollars)
        Advances ($Mill.) 1,582 26,201 1,556.2%
        Percent of Total Advances 2.0% 6.0%
Total Borrowers 1,554 5,210 235.3%
        Total Advances ($Mill.) 78,780 437,900 455.9%
The Financial Modernization (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) Act of 1999 defines a “Community Financial 
Institution” as a bank with less than $500 million in assets.  We use this standard to define community 
banks.  To account for the effects of inflation, we deflated the $500 million benchmark to $429.5 million 
for 1992.  The total members figure include insurance companies and credit unions. 
Sources: Federal Housing Finance Board, Reports of Income and Condition for U.S. Commercial 
Banks, 1992 and 2000
Table 1                                        
Between 1992 and 2000, Home Loan Bank membership more than doubled, and advances outstanding 
more than quintupled.  Behind these aggregate numbers lie other interesting trends.  The number of 
thrift institutions belonging to the System dropped by nearly one-third, due to the contraction of the 
industry.  At the same time, the total number of commercial bank members rose by 338 percent.  
Although the percentage increase in commercial bank borrowing was large, due to the small 1992 
base, the dollar value of advances to thrifts rose by slightly more ($182.6 billion) than did the dollar 
value of advances to commercial banks ($160.7 billion).  Also, advances outstanding to large 
commercial banks at year-end 2000 were more than five times advances outstanding to community 
financial institutions. 
Membership by Type of Financial Institution
Advances Outstanding By Member Type




















*The sample period is December 1992 through December 2000 except for Risk Based Capital 
as a percent of Risk Weighted assets (March 1996 through December 2000) and Change in 
EVE to Assets (March 1997 through December 2000).                             
Return on Assets Return on Equity
-0.35 -3.34





This table displays the median risk measures for commercial banks with composite or 
component CAMELS ratings of 2 and 3 over the sample period.*  We use these ratios to 
assess the economic significance of any differences in risk ratios between Home Loan Bank 
members and nonmembers.  For example, the median bank with a composite CAMELS rating 
of 2 had an estimated probability of failure of 0.04 percent compared with 0.31 percent for the 
median bank with a composite CAMELS rating of 3.  The difference of 0.27 percent is used as 
the benchmark for an economically significant difference in failure probability between 
members and nonmembers and as the benchmark for change in the failure probability for 
members as a result of increased dependence on advances.                                                        




















     Failure probability 0.000 0.0 1.00 1.00
     Asset growth -0.001 *** 10.5 1.00 1.00
     Equity to total assets -0.054 *** 3217.1 0.95 0.96
     Noncore funding to total assets -0.019 *** 1568.4 0.98 0.95
     Total loans to core deposits -0.005 *** 1012.6 1.00 0.96
     Nonperforming loans to total loans 0.017 *** 65.4 1.02 1.02
     Commercial real estate to total assets -0.005 *** 162.8 1.00 0.99
     One year GAP -0.013 *** 3300.9 0.99 0.95
Control variables:
     Log of Total Assets 0.060 *** 518.3 1.062 1.06
     ROA 0.012 *** 8.0 1.01 1.00
*** significant at the one percent level
**  significant at the five percent level
Likelihood Ratio 9,444.4
N 133,720
             Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Table 3
Adverse Selection and a Proportional Hazard Model
We employ a Cox proportional hazards model to estimate the importance of adverse selection 
incentives on the decision by commercial banks to join the FHLB.  Specifically, we regress the 
duration of time that a bank is a nonmember against a set of risk and control variables.  Positive 
coefficients imply that banks are likely to join the FHLB sooner given an increase in the indenpendent 
variable.  The results indicate that adverse selction incentives were weak.  Only two of the eight risk 
coefficients--equity to total assets and nonperforming loans--are statistically significant with the 
expected signs.  The adjusted hazard ratio computes the likelihood of membership given an 
economically significant change in the risk variable such that ratios far away from one are 
economically significant.  All of the hazard ratios in this regression are economically small.  The 
adjusted hazard ratio for equity to total assets, for example, indicates that a bank with an equity to 













36Coefficient Chi-Square Odds Ratio
Adjusted 
Odds Ratio
Intercept -6.68 *** 124.4
Risk variables:
     Failure probability -0.04 *** 9.9 0.97 0.99
     Asset growth 0.01 *** 14.2 1.01 1.04
     Equity to total assets -0.07 *** 17.5 0.93 0.95
     Noncore funding to total assets -0.01 * 3.1 0.99 0.98
     Total loans to core deposits 0.01 *** 27.4 1.01 1.11
     Nonperforming loans to total loans -0.07 *** 9.0 0.93 0.92
     Commercial real estate to total assets -0.01 1.5 0.99 0.99
     One year GAP 0.00 2.2 1.00 0.98
Control variables:
     Log of Total Assets 0.35 *** 75.3 1.42 1.51
     CFI Indicator 0.89 *** 25.4 2.44 1.21
     ROA -0.05 0.6 0.95 0.98
*** significant at the one percent level
**  significant at the five percent level
*   significant at the ten percent level
Number of joiners 1079




Adverse Selection and Logit Analysis
Banks with relatively high risk in 1989 might have been the first to take advantage of non-risk-priced 
FHLB funding to avoid market discipline.  We investigated the importance of this adverse selection 
incentive by using a logit model to predict FHLB membership.  A joiner (nonjoiner) is a bank that was 
(not) an FHLB member by year-end 1992.  Banks' risk ratios from 1989 are used in the regressions to 
control for endogenous risk changes after becoming members or anticipating membership.  The 
adjusted odds ratio computes the odds of joining the FHLB given an economically significant change in 
the risk ratio as defined by the CAMELS benchmark differences.  
             Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
The results suggest that adverse selection incentives were weak.  Banks with higher liquidity and 
leverage risk joined the FHLB before other banks, but early joiners also had lower credit risk and lower 
composite risk as measured by failure probability.  The most economically significant variable was the 
total loan to core deposit ratio. A bank with a ratio of loans to deposits that was 8.45 percentage points 
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Note:  *** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent level.
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This table compares changes in composite and specific risk measures for matched pairs of Home Loan Bank members 
and nonmembers.  Each bank that joined the System between December 1992 and December 1998 was matched with a 
comparable institution that was not a member and would not become a member for at least two years.  We then conducted 
t-tests of the hypotheses that the means of the changes in risk ratios for the two groups over the two years were equal.  
Leverage and liquidity risks increased the most following membership.  For example, equity as a percent of assets of 
joiners decreased, on average, over the two years since joining by  5 basis points.  At peer banks, equity as a percent of 
assets increased by 0.35 basis points.The 39 basis point difference (due to rounding) between the two means is 








We assessed economic significance by comparing the difference in means to the benchmarks established in Table 2.  For 
example, the difference in the change of equity to asset ratios between joiners and peers represents 50 percent of the 
economic significance benchmark.  Taken together, the evidence suggests that membership had a statistically significant 




0.004 0.906 61.7 74,402 0.00
1-Year Growth of Assets -0.125 5.618 *** 28.8 72,964 0.05
Equity/Total Assets
-0.033 16.082 *** 24.1 72,973 0.05
Risk-Based Capital/Risk-
Weighted Assets -0.051 13.618 *** 11.9 65,409 0.07
Noncore Funding/Total 
Assets 0.309 40.765 *** 8.5 72,992 0.28
Loans/Core Deposits 0.350 20.507 *** 24.1 72,998 0.27
Nonperforming Loans/Total 
Loans 0.008 5.951 *** 139.5 73,667 0.01
Commercial Real Estate 
Loans/Total Assets -0.037 6.047 *** -32.2 72,934 0.17
1-year GAP/Total Assets
-0.045 3.320 *** -79.5 72,925 0.22
Change in EVE/Assets -0.001 0.975 380.4 55,049 0.19
Table 6
The Impact of Advances on Bank Risk
Dependent Variable:      
Measures of Risk
R-squared
This table displays the results from a fixed-effects regression, regressing risk measures at commercial banks that 
belong to the Home Loan Bank System on advances lagged five to eight quarters, bank size lagged eight quarters, 
and quarterly time dummies.  The coefficients on lagged advances are summed for each regression and reported in 
the table.  We assess economic significance by calculating the percentage point change in the advances-to-total 
assets ratio necessary to produce the relevant CAMELS benchmark change; we view percentage point changes 
below 15 as significant because most banks can increase their ratios of advances to assets by 15 percentage points 
with little difficulty.
Overall, the evidence suggests that dependence on advances has only a modest impact on bank risk.  Most of the 
summed advances coefficients are statistically significant at the one-percent level.  However, with the exception of 
risk-based capital and noncore funding, the percentage point increases in the dependence ratios necessary to 
produce economically significant changes in the risk measures are quite large.  
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FHLBank Advances as an Escape from Market Discipline:
















FHLBank Advances as an Escape from Market Discipline:
The Bank Assumes More Credit Risk
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